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Abstract
We study the determinants of capital intensity and technology content
of foreign direct investment, an important economic driving force for de-
veloping countries. For this purpose, we use sectoral industry data on U.S.
foreign investment abroad, and data on host countries￿institutional char-
acteristics, like investment climate, protection of property rights, labor
standards and constitutional arrangements. Our regressions show that
better protection of property rights has a signi￿cant positive e⁄ect on
R&D but not on capital intensive capital ￿ ows. There is evidence that an
increase in workers￿bargaining power results in a reduction of capital and
technologically intensive foreign investment. And although the evidence
with respect to constitutional arrangements is not very strong, presiden-
tial regimes appear to be less able than parliamentary ones to deliver
policies attracting R&D intensive capital ￿ ows. This is consistent with
recent research on the e⁄ects of constitutional arrangements on economic
growth.
1 Introduction
There has been a spectacular increase in capital ￿ ows in the last two decades. In
particular, foreign direct investment (FDI) has been growing three times as fast
as total investment between 1980 and 2000. Over this period, there has been
also a change in the nature of FDI ￿ owing to developing countries. Previously,
foreign investment was concentrated to the extraction of natural resources for
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1shipment abroad. Nowadays, as developing countries become wealthier, invest-
ment diversi￿es into production of consumer goods for their local markets. The
increasing size and variety of these ￿ ows has made both economists and policy
makers interested in understanding their determinants and e⁄ects. Research,
on the one hand, tries to understand how FDI a⁄ects productivity and growth,
or income inequality and the environment. On the other hand, many studies
try to pinpoint the host and source country and industry characteristics behind
FDI ￿ ows. A question of interest among developing countries is what policies
are better at attracting much needed capital and new technologies. A number
of studies have found that institutional quality is a positive determinant of FDI
(and thus, in particular, corruption is a negative determinant), higher taxation
reduces capital ￿ ows, and more protection of intellectual property rights at-
tracts high-tech investment. The data shows mixed results on other dimensions
of policy. For example, Rodrik (1996) found that countries with higher labor
standards attract more FDI, an e⁄ect that seems to disappear when controlling
for political risk (see Cho (2003)). And measures of labor costs and workers￿
bargaining power are found to have a negative e⁄ect on FDI (Smarzynska and
Spatareanu (2005) and Cooke (1997)).
In this essay, we analyze the determinants of FDI by looking at the deter-
minants of FDI composition. This is done by studying the interaction between
some industry characteristics and host country characteristics. We use capital
intensity and R&D expenditures for industry characteristics1 and measures on
protection of property rights, labor standards and constitutional arrangements
for host country characteristics. Our regressions show that a better protection
of property rights attracts high-tech investment; a result which is not surpris-
ing, given the correlation that exists between the overall protection of property
rights and the degree of protection of intellectual property rights. But FDI
￿ owing to countries with a low protection of property rights is not biased to
less capital intensive sectors. We also ￿nd that countries which give workers
more bargaining power attract less capital intensive and high-tech investment.
Finally, we ￿nd that a country￿ s constitutional arrangement has an e⁄ect on
FDI ￿ ows. We look at whether presidential regimes and majoritarian electoral
systems, as opposed to parliamentary and proportional, respectively, have a
di⁄erential e⁄ect on FDI. We ￿nd evidence of there being a negative e⁄ect of
presidential regimes on R&D intensive FDI. This ￿nding is consistent with re-
cent results of Persson (2005) which show that these political institutions have
an e⁄ect on growth rates.
For our empirical analysis, we use data on US investment abroad provided
by the Bureau of Economic Analysis. They provide yearly FDI data between
1999 and 2003 for 14 industry categories. Both manufacturing and services data
is reported, and capital and R&D intensity are calculated from this same data
source. For host country institutions, we use an average of data for the nineties,
since some measures do not have data available for more recent years. Ideally
1Helpman et al (2004) use capital intensity and R&D intensity as proxies for unobserved
industry characteristics.
2we would like to perform a panel regression. But, due to the lack of data and
time variation, we instead do a cross-section analysis. As a ￿rst approximation,
we look at the interactions of industry characteristics with the institutional
variables that constitute the focus of our study. Given that other country char-
acteristics might have di⁄erential e⁄ects on FDI composition, we then introduce
interaction terms of industry characteristics with known determinants of FDI
￿ ows.2
This paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we summarize the state of
the current literature on determinants of FDI, with a particular emphasis on the
institutional characteristics that are subject to study in this essay. In section 3,
we develop the hypotheses we want to test. Section 4 presents the econometric
speci￿cation and describes the data used. Section 5 presents the results and in
section 6, we conclude and describe prospective further research.
2 Related literature
Researchers have had an interest in understanding FDI from two di⁄erent per-
spectives. Trade economists are interested in FDI as a substitute for trade
exports. A ￿rm has two ways of servicing a foreign market. It can either ex-
port ￿nal goods produced at home, or it can directly set up multiple production
plants in those markets. The importance of this decision can be grasped by not-
ing that the largest 500 multinationals control approximately 50% of world trade
(Rugman 1988). There are many reasons why a ￿rm might choose the second
alternative over the ￿rst. The size of a host country market, its expected growth,
input costs and natural resources, as well as its policy environment, are of impor-
tance for this decision. There is also a trade-o⁄between proximity to costumers
and the advantages of scale economies from concentrated production. Riker and
Brainard (1997) use US ￿rm level data to test this last hypothesis. They ￿nd
evidence that tari⁄s and trade costs have a negative e⁄ect on the share of ex-
ports over total sales (exports plus a¢ liate sales), while plant economies of scale
have a positive e⁄ect on the export share. More recently, Helpman et al (2004)
introduce intraindustry heterogeneity into a standard proximity-concentration
model. To control for omitted industry characteristics, they include measures
of capital intensity and R&D intensity. They ￿nd that capital intensity has a
signi￿cant negative e⁄ect on the ratio of exports to FDI sales, while there is no
signi￿cant e⁄ect of R&D intensity.
Development economists are interested in the e⁄ects of FDI on host coun-
tries￿productivity and growth performance, and its environmental and social
implications. Aitken and Harrison (1999) studied if FDI ￿ ows had an e⁄ect on
Venezuelan ￿rms and found a small e⁄ect. Haskel et al (2002) studied the e⁄ect
of FDI on a sample of UK manufacturing ￿rms and found evidence of positive
FDI spillovers, although the size of these e⁄ects was not very large. Given that
2We control for population size, GDP per capita, trade openness, human capital, and the
size of the government as a proxy for tax rates.
3even if there are few spillovers, FDI still brings new technologies and manage-
ment skills to the host country, governments all over the world compete for
investment from multinational corporations. In order to attract these capital
￿ ows, it is important to understand the factors in￿ uencing FDI decisions as well
as the determinants of the composition of such ￿ ows.
Smith (2001) studied how foreign patent rights a⁄ected US exports, a¢ li-
ate sales and licenses. She found that strong patent rights increase the ￿ ow of
knowledge to a¢ liates, as the risk of imitation is reduced. Smarzynska Javor-
cik (2004) ￿nds similar results using ￿rm data for Eastern Europe and former
Soviet Union countries. It is also found that weak protection deters FDI in
technology-intensive sectors, and biases investment on projects focusing on dis-
tribution rather than local production. A number of papers have shown that
host countries￿institutional quality in general is a signi￿cant determinant of
FDI ￿ ows.3 Alfaro et al (2003) ￿nd evidence that institutional quality is the
most important predictor of capital ￿ ows for the period 1971-1998. As mea-
sures of institutional quality, they use government stability, internal con￿ ict,
corruption, observance of the law, repudiation of contracts, and expropriation
risk. Of these measures, the one that received most attention in the literature is
corruption. Wei (2000) ￿nds that corruption has a large negative e⁄ect on FDI
using data on ￿ ows between 12 source countries and 45 host countries. The
e⁄ect found is the economic equivalent of an increase of up to 50 percentage
points in the tax rate. Finally, using the same ￿rm level data of Smarzynska
Javorcik (2004), Smarzynska and Wei (2000) ￿nd that corruption does not only
discourage inward FDI, but also shifts the ownership structure towards joint
ventures. They conclude that this is evidence of the value of a local partner
in minimizing the costs of bureaucratic procedures. They ￿nd no e⁄ect of cor-
ruption on R&D intensive FDI, but technologically more advanced ￿rms retain
ownership in more corrupt countries.4
Another series of papers has studied the impact of labor market regulations
and labor standards on FDI. Cooke (1997) found that US FDI was negatively
a⁄ected by the presence of high levels of union penetration, centralized collec-
tive bargaining structures, and sti⁄ restrictions on layo⁄s. Conversely, Rodrik
(1996) found that countries with higher labor standards (as measured by the
total number of International Labor Organization conventions rati￿ed by the
country) attract more FDI. Recently, Cho (2003) showed that replicating Ro-
drik￿ s regression with political stability as an added regressor eliminated the
signi￿cance of labor standards on FDI ￿ ows. In her regressions, it is a higher
level of political risk that discourages FDI ￿ ows. Smarzynska Javorcik and
Spatareanu (2005) use ￿rm level data for 25 European countries and ￿nd that
greater ￿ exibility in the host country￿ s labor market (measured by ￿ exibility of
3In fact, there is a strong correlation between these measures of institutional quality and
the measures of protection of patent rights used in the above mentioned papers.
4See also Henisz (2000), who examines the e⁄ect of corruption on FDI, market entry,
and ownership mode for US based multinational ￿rms, ￿nding at most a positive e⁄ect of
corruption on FDI ￿ows. Hines (1995) also failed in ￿nding a negative correlation between
aggregate FDI in￿ows and corruption levels in host countries.
4dismissals, length of notice period, and required severance payments) is associ-
ated with larger FDI ￿ ows. FDI in service sectors appears to be more a⁄ected
than investment in manufactures, something they attribute to services being
more labor intensive than manufactures.
There is another literature that studies the e⁄ects of constitutions on eco-
nomic policymaking. Persson and Tabellini (2003 and 2004) have found sys-
tematic and quantitatively large e⁄ects of both electoral rules and forms of
governments on ￿scal policy and corruption. They ￿nd that the size of the
government, as a percentage of GDP, is 5 percentage points lower in countries
with presidential regimes and majoritarian electoral systems. There is also an
e⁄ect of these constitutional variables on the composition of expenditure, with
welfare spending being 2 percentage points lower in countries with presidential
regimes and majoritarian electoral systems. Although this research started with
the aim of empirically validating theoretical models of how the rules of policy-
making a⁄ected actual policy5, it is spreading in new directions. Persson (2005)
combines these insights with research on long-run economic development that
shows certain structural policies to be essential for economic performance. He
shows constitutional arrangements to have an e⁄ect on some structural poli-
cies (protection of property rights, and trade openness) that promote long-run
economic growth. In particular, he ￿nds that parliamentary democracies with
proportional representation produce the most growth promoting policies.
3 Hypotheses to be tested
We are primarily interested in the determinants of the composition of FDI ￿ ows.
Therefore, we need to di⁄erentiate these ￿ ows according to some dimensions
that might be of interest both to the economic researcher and the policymaker.
We will concentrate on two characteristics of ￿ ows that seem to be particularly
relevant; capital intensity and R&D intensity. Several studies use one or both
of these variables6, thus giving us con￿dence in the academic front. And FDI
is seen as globalization at its best for developing countries, not only providing
capital but a potent bundle of capital, managerial and technological knowledge.
Thus, policymakers in developing countries would agree with us on the impor-
tance of understanding what policies attract more R&D and capital intensive
FDI.
As we just saw in the previous section, better institutions in general at-
tract more aggregate ￿ ows, and better protection of intellectual property rights
in particular biases these ￿ ows towards more technology-intensive sectors. It
seems natural to ask whether other dimensions of a host country￿ s institutional
strength also have a di⁄erential e⁄ect on the composition of FDI ￿ ows. Given
that corruption has received substantial attention in previous works, we would
5See, for example, Persson and Tabellini (1999) and Lizzeri and Persico (2001).
6As reported above, Helpman et al (2004) use both capital and R&D intensity as proxies
for industry unobservables. Smarzynska Javorcik (2004) and Smarzynska and Wei (2000) try
to distinguish FDI ￿ows according to their technological intensity.
5like to see if countries with less corruption indeed receive more R&D inten-
sive investments than more corrupt countries. Another measure of institutional
quality that we study is expropriation risk. We would expect that the higher is
this risk, the less capital and R&D intensive will foreign investments be. Obser-
vance of the law, repudiation of contracts, and the quality of the bureaucracy
are also expected to have a similar e⁄ect on the composition of FDI ￿ ows.
Why would the composition of FDI ￿ ows be a⁄ected by labor institutions?
We have seen that the literature has found a number of e⁄ects of labor market
characteristics on the size of aggregate ￿ ows. It does not surprise us to see that
countries with less ￿ exible labor markets receive less investments. It has long
been known that one of the driving forces behind the decision to move pro-
duction abroad is to reduce input costs. If regulations make hiring labor more
expensive, investment will in general be lower. Instead of looking at measures
of labor market ￿ exibility (severance payments or ￿ exibility of dismissals), we
study the e⁄ect of an increase in the power of labor negotiation on the com-
position of ￿ ows. As workers￿bargaining power increases, the higher are their
wages, especially in capital and R&D intensive industries, where there are more
economic rents to bargain for. Thus, we expect to see less capital and R&D
intensive foreign investment in countries with higher union penetration. We
also check whether collective bargaining has an e⁄ect on the composition of
FDI ￿ ows. We expect to see two opposite forces at work. On the one hand,
centralized bargaining results in more union power and thus, should a⁄ect FDI
composition in a similar way as union penetration. On the other hand, decen-
tralized bargaining means that labor contracts within an industry more closely
follow ￿rms￿productivity levels, thus potentially deterring capital and R&D
intensive investment. Anticipating our results, we ￿nd that the former e⁄ect
dominates, but the impact on FDI composition is weaker than that found for
unionization.
We are ￿nally interested in studying whether host countries￿political arrange-
ments have an e⁄ect on the level and composition of FDI. Although it seems
unrealistic to think that a country would reform its constitution to change its
form of government just to attract more FDI, we expect this research to be use-
ful in two respects. First, by contributing to further understanding why some
countries are better at attracting foreign investment than others. If constitu-
tional features are part of the reason why a country fails to deliver policies that
create the investment friendly environment desired by multinational corpora-
tions, there is no point in pushing the country for structural reforms. At the
same time, as research ￿nds more evidence on the social and economic costs of
some forms of government, there will be a stronger case in favor of constitutional
reform. Following recent work by Persson (2005), we expect to see higher FDI
￿ ows in parliamentary democracies with proportional representation and a bias
in these ￿ ows towards more capital and R&D intensive sectors.
64 Econometric speci￿cation and data
4.1 Econometric speci￿cation
Given that we want to estimate the e⁄ect of institutional variables on the com-
position of FDI, we should ideally use panel data with variation in source and
host countries, and with data for a long period and a large number of industries.
This would provide some time variation in the institutional variables of interest
while, at the same time, making it possible to use country ￿xed e⁄ects to con-
trol for other country unobservables. Moreover, if there is time variation in the
industry characteristics, such as R&D intensity, we could also control for other
industry unobservables by using industry ￿xed e⁄ects. Having several source
countries would also allow us to test whether it is host country institutions per
se that are of importance, or both source and host country institutions (conve-
niently compared) that a⁄ect bilateral ￿ ows. The data to which we have access
limits our ability to perform this analysis. We have institutional data up to the
end of the nineties, and FDI out￿ ows from a single source country, the U.S.,
into 56 host countries from 1999 to 2003.
Thus, we restrict ourselves to performing a cross-section study trying to get
the most out of our data. For that reason, we exploit the variation in industry
characteristics to see the di⁄erential e⁄ects of institutional variables on sectoral
FDI, while at the same time controlling for country characteristics. Thus, to
give an example, we do not directly estimate the e⁄ect of corruption on FDI,
but whether more corrupt countries attract more or less capital intensive FDI.
To perform these regressions, we should take into account the existence of
many zero, and even negative, values for some sector-country pairs, meaning
FDI in￿ ows. Moreover, when seeing a negative value for FDI, we are not certain
of whether that value re￿ ects the desired actual level of negative investment,
or just the observed level of disinvestment given the constraints in reducing
exposure in a given host country. Therefore, we treat negative values as zeroes
as well and thus use a Tobit speci￿cation.7 The regression to estimate is
ln(FDIic) = Xi￿ + IcXi￿ + ￿c + ￿ (1)
where FDIic is investment in sector i in country c, Ic is a vector of institutional
variables in country c, Xi is a vector of industry i characteristics, and ￿ is the
regression coe¢ cient we want to estimate: the interaction between institutions
and industry characteristics on FDI ￿ ows. Finally, the ￿c are country ￿xed
e⁄ects and the error term ￿ is assumed to be i.i.d. normally distributed with
mean zero and variance ￿2. In this speci￿cation, there will be positive foreign
investment when Xi￿ +IcXi￿ +￿c +￿ > 0, and when Xi￿ +IcXi￿ +￿c +￿ ￿ 0
the realized level will be zero (and the desired level might be negative, as seen
in the data).
7Given that we use logarithm of FDI as our independent variable, we replace zeroes and
negative values by small positive numbers, such that the log gives a large negative number,
and we truncate the distribution just below the lowest positive observation. Performing small
changes in this threshold has no signi￿cant e⁄ect on the regressions.
7The use of country ￿xed e⁄ects allows us to correctly estimate this di⁄er-
ential e⁄ect under the hypothesis that the institutional variable of interest in
the regression, corruption for example, is the only country characteristic with
a di⁄erential e⁄ect on FDI composition. Given that this is a strong assump-
tion, we perform another set of regressions. In these, we introduce interaction
terms between country characteristics that have been found to a⁄ect FDI, or
that we expect could possibly a⁄ect the composition of FDI, and industry char-
acteristics. The variables we use are population, as market size is a signi￿cant
determinant of capital ￿ ows, GDP per capita, as a proxy of labor costs, trade
openness (measured as exports plus imports over GDP), which gives a measure
of the ability to integrate production chains in a given country, government ex-
penditure (as a fraction of GDP), to proxy for tax rates, and human capital.
We denote the vector of these variables by Wc. The following is the equation
we estimate
ln(FDIic) = Xi￿ + IcXi￿ + WcXi￿ + ￿c + ￿: (2)
Finally, as a robustness check, we drop the country ￿xed e⁄ects and instead
use the above mentioned country variables, and their interaction with industry
characteristics, along with other regressors8. The estimated equation is
ln(FDIic) = Xi￿ + IcXi￿ + WcXi￿ + Wc + ￿: (3)
As another check, we also did a regression with the same regressors as the
above, replacing industry characteristics by industry ￿xed e⁄ects. The results
are very similar in signi￿cance and size and thus, we do not report them.
4.2 Data description
The data used in this study mainly comes from three sources. The data to
compute our dependent variable, the U.S. direct investment abroad (USFDI),
comes from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) of the U.S. Department of
Commerce. We use Total Capital Flows, detailed by industry and by country.
The variable is measured in millions of dollars and the data available is for 56
countries plus some regional aggregates. We average the annual Total Capital
Flows across years for the period 1999-2003 for each country and each industry
category.
In addition, we computed two variables for each industry category: capital
intensity, the ratio between capital and labor expenditures (CAPINT); and the
ratio between R&D and capital expenditures (RDCAP). A list of categories and
their respective characteristics is included on Table 1.9
8We use continental dummies to proxy for geographical location variables that might a⁄ect
FDI ￿ows, the fraction of host countries￿natives that speak English, and whether the legal
system is similar to the US one, as transaction costs might be reduced when speaking the
same language or sharing the same legal system.
9All tables are in the appendix.
8The data on labor market indicators comes from a cross-country database
described in Rama and Artecona (2002). This dataset includes 121 countries.
Figures are reported for ￿ve-year period averages, from 1945-49 to 1995-1999.
Our ￿ve variables of interest are classi￿ed into two broad categories: (1) trade
unions and collective bargaining, and (2) labor standards. In the ￿rst category,
we use the following variables10: total trade union membership, in percentage of
the total labor force (TUMMBR) and workers covered by collective bargaining
agreements, in percentage of total salaried or dependent workers (TUCVGE). In
the labor standard category, we use: cumulative number of ILO (International
Labor Organization) conventions rati￿ed by the country (ILOCNV); rati￿ca-
tion of the ILO convention on the right of workers and employers to establish
associations or organizations of their own, without government interference, and
to a¢ liate with similar associations at the international level (ORGNZE); and
rati￿cation of ILO convention on the right to bargain collectively (BRGAIN).
To build our cross-section dataset, we took averages for the last two periods:
1990-1994 and 1995-1999 for the 56 countries for which we have data on US
direct investment.
The third source of data is an extended version of the cross-section described
in the book by Persson and Tabellini (2003). Their data set is used to study
the relation between constitutional rules and policy outcomes across democra-
cies. Therefore, it has variables describing economic performance (e.g. GDP per
capita, human capital), economic policy (openness, government consumption,
protection of property rights), forms of democracy and political institutions
(dummy variables for democracy, majoritarian democracy, presidential democ-
racy), protection of property rights, and other country characteristics (conti-
nental location, colonial origin, legal origin). We extended their dataset to
also include non-democracies. Variables are collected for as many countries as
possible on an annual basis. A detailed description of the variables follows:
Protection of Property Rights. The primary source for the next ￿ve vari-
ables is Knack and Keefer (1995).
CORRUPTION ￿Variable ￿Corruption in Government￿from the Interna-
tional Country Risk Guide. Lower scores indicate ￿high government o¢ cials
are likely to demand special payments￿and that ￿illegal payments are gener-
ally expected throughout lower levels of government￿ in the form of ￿bribes
connected with import and export licenses, exchange controls, tax assessment,
police protection, or loans.￿The variable runs from 0 to 10.
RULE OF LAW (named ￿Law and Order Tradition￿in ICRG) ￿This vari-
able ￿re￿ ects the degree to which the citizens of a country are willing to ac-
cept the established institutions to make and implement laws and adjudicate
disputes.￿Higher scores indicate: ￿sound political institutions, a strong court
system, and provisions for an orderly succession of power.￿Lower scores indi-
cate: ￿a tradition of depending on physical force or illegal means for settling
claims.￿Upon changes in government new leaders ￿may be less likely to accept
10We refer to Rama and Artecona (2002) for a detailed explanation of the variables.
9the obligations of the previous regime.￿The variable runs from 0 to 10.
REPUDIATION (Risk of Repudiation of Contracts by Government) ￿￿This
indicator addresses the possibility that foreign businesses, contractors, and con-
sultants face the risk of a modi￿cation in a contract taking the form of a repudia-
tion, postponement, or scaling down￿due to ￿an income drop, budget cutbacks,
indigenization pressure, a change in government, or a change in government eco-
nomic and social priorities.￿Lower scores signify ￿a greater likelihood that a
country will modify or repudiate a contract with a foreign business.￿The vari-
able runs from 0 to 10.
EXPROPRIATION (Risk of Expropriation of Private Investment) ￿This
variables evaluates the risk of ￿outright con￿scation and forced nationalization￿
of property. Lower ratings ￿are given to countries where expropriation of private
foreign investment is a likely event.￿The variable runs from 0 to 10.
GADP ￿index of government￿ s anti-diversion policies. It is an equal-weighted
average of these ￿ve categories: i) law and order, ii) bureaucratic quality, iii)
corruption, iv) risk of expropriation and v) government repudiation of contracts
(each of these items has higher values for governments with more e⁄ective poli-
cies towards supporting production) and ranges from zero to one.
Economic Performance.
GDPPC ￿Real GDP per capita in 2000 U.S. dollars (Constant price: Chain
series). Primary source: Penn World Table 6.1
POPULATION ￿Source: Penn World Table 6.1, in thousands.
TRADE ￿sum of exports and imports of goods and services measured as a
share of GDP. Source: The World Bank￿ s World Development Indicators 2002.
CG ￿central government expenditures as a percentage of GDP, constructed
using the item Government Finance ￿Expenditures in the IFS, divided by GDP
at current prices and multiplied by 100. Source: IMF/IFS
HUMANCAPITAL ￿Follows Hall and Jones (1999) with data from Barro
and Lee (2000).
Constitutional Variables.
MAJ ￿dummy variable for electoral systems. Equals 1 if the entire lower
house is elected under plurality rule, 0 otherwise. Only legislative elections
(lower house) are considered. Source: see Persson and Tabellini (2003)
PRES ￿dummy variable for forms of government, equal to 1 in presidential
regimes, 0 otherwise. Only regimes where the con￿dence of the assembly is
not necessary for the executive (even if an elected president is not the chief
executive, or if there is no elected president) are included among presidential
regimes. Most semi-presidential and premier-presidential systems are classi￿ed
as parliamentary. Source: see Persson and Tabellini (2003).
Other Country Characteristics.
LAAM ￿regional dummy variable, equal to 1 if a country is in Latin Amer-
ica, Central America or the Caribbeans, 0 otherwise.
10OECD ￿dummy variable, equal to 1 for all countries that were members of
OECD before 1993, 0 otherwise, except for Turkey coded as 0, even though it
was a member of OECD before the 1990s.
AFRICA ￿regional dummy variable, equal to 1 if a country is in Africa, 0
otherwise.
ASIAE ￿regional dummy variable, equal to 1 if a country is in East Asia,
0 otherwise.
ENGFRAC ￿the fraction of the population speaking English as a native
language. Source: Hall and Jones (1999).
LEGOR_UK ￿dummy variables for the origin of the legal system, clas-
sifying a country￿ s legal system into Anglo-Saxon Common Law. Source: La
Porta et al. (1998).
Table 2 brings the summary statistics for the main variables used in the
regressions:
5 Empirical results
5.1 Protection of Property Rights
The empirical analysis ￿nds substantial evidence of di⁄erential e⁄ects of the de-
gree of protection of property rights on FDI composition. In Table 3, we report
the results of regressions with country ￿xed e⁄ects and only interactions between
industry characteristics, capital and R&D intensity, with measures of institu-
tional quality. We ￿nd strong negative e⁄ects of a deterioration of the protection
of property rights on R&D intensive investment, but a positive e⁄ect on capi-
tal intensive investment. As said previously, these regressions provide accurate
results under the strong assumption that there are no other country charac-
teristic with a di⁄erential e⁄ect on FDI composition. We lift this assumption
and ￿nd (see Table 4) that all interaction terms between capital intensity and
measures of protection of property rights become insigni￿cant. R&D intensive
investment is still negatively a⁄ected by a lower protection of property rights.
For example, an increase of one standard deviation in CORRUPTION reduces
R&D intensive FDI (one standard deviation above its mean) by 54.3%11. For
the variable GADP, an average of all measures of protection of property rights,
a deterioration of one standard deviation reduces R&D intensive investment by
47.9%.
This is an extremely important result. Not only does corruption, and other
measures of a country￿ s protection of property rights, deter aggregate FDI ￿ ows,
but there is a signi￿cant reduction in the technological content of incoming ￿ ows.
These results are in contrast to those of Smarzynska and Wei (2000), who ￿nd
11The coe¢ cient is positive because CORRUPTION is measured in such a way that higher
values imply lower levels of corruption. The same holds for all other measures of protection
of property rights.
11no signi￿cant interaction between corruption and technological sophistication
(measured both at the ￿rm and the industry level). While theirs is a model
of the decision to invest or not, using micro data, ours is a macro result: we
see how capital ￿ ows from the U.S. to a series of countries are a⁄ected by the
degree of protection of property rights in these countries. Both sets of results
should then be seen as addressing di⁄erent questions and thus, complementing
each other. Finally, Table 5 shows that the results remain similar in size and
signi￿cance after dropping the country ￿xed e⁄ects and controlling for coun-
try characteristics. In the table, we only report the interaction coe¢ cients of
interest.
5.2 Labor standards
Given that our previous analysis showed that some country characteristics might
have a di⁄erential e⁄ect on FDI composition, we directly report the results of
the country ￿xed e⁄ects regression that includes these interaction terms. The
results are reported in table 6. There is a strong negative e⁄ect of unionization
on both capital intensity and R&D intensity of ￿ ows. Both interaction terms are
negative when we measure unionization by the dummy ORGNZE, and by mem-
bership TUMMBR. Rati￿cation of ILO convention 87 on the right to organize
reduces capital intensive FDI by 53.4% and R&D intensive FDI by 60.8%. An
increase of a standard deviation in total trade union membership decreases capi-
tal intensive foreign investment by 34.6%. The e⁄ects of collective bargaining on
FDI composition are less robust. Rati￿cation of ILO convention 98 on the right
to bargain collectively only has a signi￿cant e⁄ect on R&D intensive foreign
investment. This is reduced by 48.3% when a country has rati￿ed this conven-
tion, i.e. when BRGAIN = 1. But there is no e⁄ect on capital intensity FDI,
and no e⁄ect of the coverage of collective bargaining agreements (TUCVGE) on
either measure of FDI composition. Given that we expected to see two opposite
forces at work, one increasing capital and R&D intensive FDI, and the other
decreasing them, it is no surprise that the estimates are mostly insigni￿cant.
Finally, we follow Rodrik (1996) and check whether the total number of ILO
conventions rati￿ed by a country has a di⁄erential e⁄ect on FDI composition.
We ￿nd negative results, thus we conclude that labor standards do not have a
cumulative e⁄ect on the capital and R&D intensity of foreign investment, but
what is of importance is the type of conventions that are rati￿ed.
These results extend the ￿ndings of Smarzynska Javorcik and Spatareanu
(2005). They show that labor market ￿ exibility increases aggregate FDI ￿ ows.
While they also report that FDI in services is more a⁄ected than in manufac-
tures, their interpretation of this being due to services being more labor intensive
might be wrong. In fact, the converse is true in our sample. As can be calculated
from table 1, capital intensity in services (0.33) is higher than in manufactures
(0.25). Our results should be interpreted as indicating not that higher labor
costs deter labor intensive investment, but that a higher bargaining power for
labor deters capital and R&D intensive investment. By allowing labor to better
appropriate part of the economic rents of a project, higher bargaining power
12deters the most productive investments. And these are the more capital and
R&D intensive ones.
5.3 Constitutional arrangements
The last series of regressions we perform relate to two constitutional features
of host countries: whether the form of government is presidential or parliamen-
tary, and whether the electoral system is proportional or majoritarian. In the
regressions reported in table 8, we can see no signi￿cant e⁄ect of the electoral
system on either capital or R&D intensive foreign investment. For presidential
regimes, there is a signi￿cant negative e⁄ect in the technological content of cap-
ital ￿ ows. Countries with a presidential regime receive almost 50% less R&D
intensive research than parliamentary countries.
Although the evidence is not very strong, this result supports Persson￿ s
(2004) ￿ndings that parliamentary and proportional democracies are better at
promoting structural policies that lead to sustained long-run economic growth.
In developing countries, FDI might be the most important way of incorporating
new technologies, and thus increase their growth perspective. Thus, our result
indicates that one of the forms in which presidential regimes reduce growth is
by being unable to deliver policies attracting technologically intensive capital
￿ ows.
6 Conclusions
In the last twenty years, there has been an increase in the ￿ ows of FDI into
developing countries. As these countries become wealthier, these ￿ ows have
diversi￿ed away from the extraction of natural resources and into the production
of consumer products for their local markets. Thus, there is reverse causality
in that FDI goes to richer countries and, at the same time, provides these
countries with the capital and technology that allow them to become richer. In
this paper, we have focused on these second channels, and tried to throw some
light on how host country institutions a⁄ected the capital and R&D content of
capital in￿ ows.
We saw that there are important e⁄ects of the protection of property rights
on the technological content of foreign investment. Better protection of prop-
erty rights results in FDI being more concentrated in technologically intensive
sectors. This result strengthens the case of having an investment friendly en-
vironment, by showing that otherwise not only aggregate capital ￿ ows will be
reduced, but there will be a deterioration in the technological content of in-
coming ￿ ows. We also saw that there is evidence that giving more power to
workers results in a decrease in capital and R&D intensive foreign investment.
We do not advice developing countries to reduce workers￿rights, but make the
point that a strengthening of workers￿power should be done hand in hand with
other measures compensating the negative e⁄ects on the technological content
of foreign investment.
13Finally, we found partial evidence of presidential regimes failing, as com-
pared with parliamentary ones, in delivering policies attracting technologically
intensive FDI. The reason for this might be that the con￿dence requirement in-
herent in parliamentary arrangements helps producing a more stable and broad
legislation, for example, better protection of property rights.
We intend to explore the link between protection of property rights, and the
size and composition of FDI in more detail. We are constructing a larger data
set with more time, country, and industry variation to see the two channels
more clearly: from protection of property rights to FDI and from constitutional
arrangements to protection of property rights.
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Manufacturing: Food 0.236 0.151
Manufacturing: Chemicals 0.273 1.257
Manufacturing: Primary and fabricated metals 0.208 0.190
Manufacturing: Machinery 0.276 0.984
Manufacturing: Computer and electronic products 0.299 1.603
Manufacturing: Electrical eq. appliances and components 0.221 0.758
Manufacturing: Transportation equipment 0.290 0.638
Wholesale trade 0.358 0.259
Information 0.684 0.094
Financial (except depositary institutions and insurance) 0.165 0.018
Professional, scienti￿cal, and technical services 0.146 0.691
Other industries 0.259 0.025
Source: BEA (2005)
17Table 2: Summary Statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
USFDI 157.18 727.4 -800 13619.2
CORRUPTION 6.93 2.09 3.33 10
EXPROPRIATION 9.17 0.91 6.15 10
REPUDIATION 8.57 1.21 5.59 10
RULE OF LAW 7.71 2.04 2.46 10
GADP 0.75 0.18 0.41 1
ORGNZE 0.75 0.42 0 1
BRGAIN 0.77 0.41 0 1
TUMMBR 26.87 20.9 0 85.3
TUCVGE 56.62 28.6 3.7 95
ILOCNV 54.29 28.9 4 124.4
MAJ 0.29 0.44 0 1
PRES 0.38 0.49 0 1
POPULATION 81897 211437 262.9 1189411
GDPPC 12772.6 7731.3 982.9 32785.9
HUMANCAPITAL 2.46 0.46 1.67 3.25
TRADE 73.54 54.75 17.57 355.1
CG 13.89 6.83 5.52 29.5
OECD 0.46 0.48 0 1
LAAM 0.23 0.42 0 1
ASIAE 0.14 0.35 0 1
AFRICA 0.05 0.23 0 1
ENGFRAC 0.11 0.28 0 1
LEGOR_UK 0.29 0.45 0 1
18In all the regressions, LOGFDI is the dependent variable and standard errors
are in parenthesis: *signi￿cant at 10%; ** signi￿cant at 5%; *** signi￿cant at
1%
Table 3: Protection of Property Rights





















capint 3.77 13.60** 7.99 4.47* 7.36**
(2.34) (6.91) (4.91) (2.61) (3.47)
rdcap -4.66*** -12.68** -10.65*** -5.22*** -8.12***
(1.66) (5.11) (3.46) (1.88) (2.48)
constant -4.22*** -4.40** 2.22 -0.70 2.22
(2.01) (2.15) (1.86) (1.93) (1.89)
N. obs. 655 655 655 655 655
Censored obs. 230 230 230 230 230
Pseudo. R2 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06
Other controls always included: country dummies
19Table 4: Protection of property rights and Economic Performance





















capint 15.56 15.00 23.57** 16.67 15.63
(11.10) (10.67) (10.98) (11.46) (12.48)
rdcap -9.30 -15.02** -9.86 -11.25 -1.33
(7.77) (7.55) (7.79) (7.99) (8.60)
constant 1.61 4.71*** 5.10*** 1.90 4.92***
(1.16) (1.49) (1.49) (1.19) (1.48)
N. Obs. 611 611 611 611 611
Censored Obs. 226 226 226 226 226
Pseudo R2 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10
Other controls always included: country dummies, capint*log(population),
rdcap*log(population), capint*log(gdppc), rdcap*log(gdppc), capint*trade,
rdcap*trade, capint*cg, rdcap*cg, capint*humancapital, rdcap*humancapital
20Table 5: Protection of Property Rights, no country dummies































capint 13.03 12.04 23.66* 14.33 11.98
(12.63) (11.77) (12.43) (12.74) (14.62)
rdcap -11.80 -16.65** -9.45 -14.86* -1.82
(8.56) (8.36) (8.88) (8.84) (9.73)
constant -31.42*** -30.04*** -38.40*** -31.42*** -36.63***
(8.68) (8.44) (8.97) (8.86) (9.87)
N. obs. 584 584 584 584 584
Censored obs. 210 210 210 210 210
Pseudo. R2 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.07
Other controls always included: log(population), log(gdppc), humancapital,
trade, cg, oecd, laam, asiae, africa, engfrac, legor_uk, capint*log(population),
rdcap*log(population), capint*log(gdppc), rdcap*log(gdppc), capint*trade,
21rdcap*trade, capint*cg, rdcap*cg, capint*humancapital, rdcap*humancapital.
22Table 6: Labor Market Indicators





















capint 23.43** 18.87* 13.82 19.86 16.97*
(10.89) (10.49) (10.42) (15.29) (10.21)
rdcap -12.85* -14.43* -16.72** -12.03 -17.42**
(7.60) (7.50) (7.33) (10.59) (7.32)
constant 4.56*** 4.74*** -1.04 3.11** 4.69***
(1.49) (1.49) (1.32) (1.42) (1.49)
N. obs. 611 611 611 400 611
Censored obs. 226 226 226 142 226
Pseudo. R2 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10
Other controls always included: country dummies, capint*log(population),
rdcap*log(population), capint*log(gdppc), rdcap*log(gdppc), capint*trade,
rdcap*trade, capint*cg, rdcap*cg, capint*humancapital, rdcap*humancapital.
23Table 7: Labor Market Indicators, no country dummies































capint 21.35* 16.52 12.62 16.98 14.90
(11.96) (11.50) (11.26) (16.19) (11.15)
rdcap -14.79* -17.20** -19.98** -12.73 -20.42**
(8.37) (8.22) (8.01) (11.22) (8.05)
constant -37.40*** -29.51*** -28.31*** -27.84** -28.68***
(8.64) (8.30) (8.09) (11.29) (8.12)
N. obs. 584 584 584 387 584
Censored obs. 210 210 210 136 210
Pseudo. R2 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.06
Other controls always included: log(population), log(gdppc), humancapital,
trade, cg, oecd, laam, asiae, africa, engfrac, legor_uk, capint*log(population),
rdcap*log(population), capint*log(gdppc), rdcap*log(gdppc), capint*trade,
24rdcap*trade, capint*cg, rdcap*cg, capint*humancapital, rdcap*humancapital.
25Table 8: Constitutional Arrangements













capint 7.85 11.16 2.16 5.96
(11.03) (11.12) (12.07) (12.46)
rdcap -14.99** -9.21 -17.17** -11.31
(7.00) (7.61) (7.67) (8.46)
constant 4.56*** 1.50 -24.70*** -28.52***
(1.48) (1.15) (8.22) (8.59)
country dummies Yes Yes No No
other characteristics No No Yes Yes
N. obs. 608 608 581 581
Censored obs. 225 225 209 209
Pseudo. R2 0.10 0.10 0.07 0.07
Other characteristics: log(population), log(gdppc), humancapital, trade, cg,
oecd, laam, asiae, africa, engfrac, legor_uk
Other controls always included: capint*log(population), rdcap*log(population),
capint*log(gdppc), rdcap*log(gdppc), capint*trade, rdcap*trade, capint*cg, rd-
cap*cg, capint*humancapital, rdcap*humancapital
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